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Abstracts
Title of Research Paper:

Research of Laytime and Demurrage

Degree:

M.Sc.

Most of the Voyage Charters (and sale and purchase contracts) will make a convention expressly of a fixed laytime to bind the part which is responsible for loading or
discharging that the operation must be complete within the time. To the owners, to
do this can let them make the voyage calculation more accurately. Or, it is difficult
the owners to know the length of the voyage since they have no idea that how long
the vessel will stay in the loading or discharging port.
One of the condition precedents is that the vessel arrived at the conventional place in
the charterparty. This is the second condition to commence the laytime. The vessel
must be ready physically and legally to loading or discharge. What extent the ready
should be according to the characters of the relevant cargo such as clean or dirty. In
common law, the owner tender the NOR in order to let the charterers/consignors
know that the vessel arrive at the loading port and is ready to load, and the laytime
can be commenced. Even in the unfixed laytime such as CQD, the vessel still has the
requirement to tender the NOR.
In the charterparties or contracts, if there was a fixed laytime, the charterers had an
absolute and unconditional contractual obligation. The risk of losing time, for example, delay when the vessel was leaving the berth/port, was shift to the owner as soon
as the laytime end. Then when the laytime end? When the loading or discharging
complete.
In a word, under the freedom of contract, which one knows more, the one is dominated.
KEYWORDS: laytime, demurrage, NOR
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background of this research
A strong effect on the maritime market is caused by the present global economic
crisis. A dramatic fall of freight rates and charter rates was visible almost immediately
in the tramp shipping segment. Many shipping companies found themselves in a very
difficult position although the global crisis caused fuel prices to drop.
Under the crisis, charter parties, including owners, charterers and brokers, are
struggling to cover their costs. All of them want to maximize the benefits. So the
disputes of contracts are easier occurring especially on some sensitive clauses.
None of the charter parties want the disputes, but there are always disputes. How
can we avoid them, at least, try to?
As the development of the shipping practice, charter contract changes made the
Charter have different explanations. As a charter party, in order to protect their own
interests, the owner and charterer shall be respectively studying the charter contract
terms each, for professional advice. If only to understand or interpret the contract
with the simple idea, and certainly a far cry from the legal interpretation, thus affec ting the respective expected benefit and risk prediction.
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1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Present research
A lot of professors have done abundant research on the laytime and demurrage.
Some articles research the laytime from the macro perspective. For example:
In (Huizhen, Problems of Demurrage(To be Continued 1), 1996), (Huizhen, Problems
of Demurrage(To be Continued

2), 1996), and (Huizhen, Problems

of

Demurrage(Finish), 1996), what touch the author deepest is, the charterer's creditworthiness and the clauses of laytime in the charter party have a direct impact on the
calculation of the demurrage. Therefore, the owner should be aware of the background of the charterer, and protect their benefits with the appropriate clauses.
Reputable charterer and the favourable clauses for the owner in charter party, tend
to get the demurrage easier, thereby, to create higher economic benefits for shipping
companies.
Some articles research laytime deeper in one, two or more aspects. For example:
From total calculation:
In (SU Tongjiang, 2005), Total calculation of laytime includes all purposes, reversible
laytime, and right to average laytime. There is no difference between the all purposes
and reversible laytime. Reversible laytime shall mean an option given to the charterer
to add together the time allowed for loading and discharging. It points out that some
domestic text books having some error in describing the meaning of reversible laytime and gives the example to illustrate the exact meaning. To average laytime shall
mean that separate calculations are to be made for loading and discharging and that
any time saved in one operation is to be set off against any excess time used in the
other.
From added clauses (WIBON, WIPON, and etc.):
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In (Yi, 2006), from several important aspects on demurrage disputes, the author illustrates some legal problem concerning demurrage with cases, invoking the theory
and legislation spirit of demurrage under the common law system. Both the owner
and the charterer often add a series of clauses to avoid the risk. Such a clause usually is WIBON or WIPON, etc.
In (Bo, 2005), the scope of application of WIBON is very limited. It only applies to the
crowded port without berths available. The clause does not apply to other circumstances such as weather and other reasons prevent the ship berthing. The correct
understanding of “Whether in Berth or Not” should be “whether in berth or not in berth
(a berth not being available)”. In other words, the owner can transfer the risk only
there is no available berth. The clause may be subject to the “Reid Test” in port
charter. The WIBON clause may bring the risk of failed to submit NOR to the owner.
WIBON clause may not be making reasonable in some cases. “Reachable on arrival”
is an assurance that the charter makes to the owner. There is a reachable safe berth
for the arriving ship, or commence the laytime. Therefore, the clause has a broader
scope of application including crowded port and various types of situation that vessels cannot reach the berth.
In (Zhe, 2007), the commencement of laytime is a very important issue in voyage
charter. It is directly related to the division of time risk on shipowner and charterer.
WIBON, WIPON, “time lost” and “berth reachable on her arrival” are more protect
shipowner, and the strength and effect are in ascending order; CQD, and “liner terms”
are more protect charterer, almost all the risk faced by the charterers bottoming out.
From NOR (SOF):
In (Tongjiang, a Number of Issues of submission of NOR by Captain, 2001), the NOR
plays an important role for the commencement of laytime and the calculation of de-
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murrage or dispatch. As a shipping company, when signing a voyage charter, should
avoid adding more prerequisites for submission of NOR. The more prerequisites, the
more unfavourable to the owner, and the more risk.
In (Hongbin, 2007), the owners want to protect their own benefits, to maintain the
effectiveness of pre-submitted NOR. The best way is not to invoke the "de minimis"
principle later, but to prepare in advance, and make sure that the short time for clean
cabin will defined as to interrupt laytime and no impact on the validity of the
pre-submitted NOR. Under the “Idle Formality”, it is necessary to consider whether
the formalities are usual, and the actual situation of the port. After considering the
above two factors can make accurate judgments.
In (Xiaoping, 1999), the “statement of facts” (SOF) is an important basis for the calculation of demurrage and dispatch. And, the demurrage is very important for shipowner. The author illustrates the consequences of the authenticity of SOF by cases,
to remind the shipping people to guard against the “statement of non-facts”.
The following articles mention some rare names such as wharf charter and dry certificate.
In (Lihong, 2009), The author proposes three viewpoints: A wharf charter avoids not
only the operational difficulties in practice in a berth charter, but also the unfavourable situation of charterer in a port charter; The pre-submission of NOR is invalid, and
if non-submit NOR, the laytime commences from the actual loading time; We should
distinguish strictly the difference between exclusion clauses and general exceptions.
In (Ling, 2008), after complete discharge, the mate will inspect the hold with some
inspection people, to check whether the cargo is completely discharge. Then, the
inspection people will issue a Dry Certificate, as legal evidence. If there is still cargo
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in the cabin, the inspection people will make a postil, “Remaining On Board” (ROB),
and write down the quantity of the rest cargo.
Some articles research the demurrage as additional freight. For example:
In (Xu Weihuang, 2007), the authors analyses the demurrage problems in voyage
charter focusing on the importance and legal nature of demurrage clauses. They
position the demurrage as additional freight, as continuation of freight, and as supplementary freight.

1.2.2 Existing problem
However, there are always problems and disputes.
As a model contract, Gencon 94 is imbalance between owner and charterer. In
(Song Bin, 2010), the authors analyse the laytime clauses in Gencon 94, and point
out that the clauses are changed compared with the previous Gencons, and too
much to protect the owner, thus cause a lot of disputes in practice. The authors give
some advice to modify the laytime clauses in Gencon 94 from the point of view of the
charterers. On the one hand, there is no exemption clause about interruption of laytime In Gencon 94. If there is a delay on laytime without owner’s intentional or negligent mistakes, the laytime is continued. To avoid such a situation, the charterer can
add extensive disclaimer clauses to the contract. On the other hand, Gencon 94
gives only a very short notice time. The charterer may modify this clause to extend
the notice time. It is advised to narrow the scope of time of the NOR submission to
the working hours.
Articles of the claim for compensation of demurrage are far from enough.
Considering the laytime and demurrage problem is so complicated, most articles only
analyse the laytime problems, and try to tell the readers that you can easily solve the
demurrage problems as soon as you calculate the laytime clearly. But I don’t think
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that’s enough. There are lots of disputes about the claim for compensation of demurrage and the time limitation of the claim for compensation. In this article
(Jinzhong, 1999), the author analyse the importance of the time limitation of the claim
for compensation in the last section.

1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Literature search
A literature search is a systematic and explicit approach to the identification, retrieval,
and bibliographic management of independent studies (usually draw from published
sources) for the purpose of locating information on a topic, synthesizing conclusions,
identifying areas for future study. Internet database searches are the most efficient
way to identify published studies. Internet searches may be supplemented with
manual searches of print sources.

1.3.2 Case study
A case study is an intensive analysis of an individual unit stressing developmental
factors in relation to context. The case study is common in social sciences and life
sciences. Case studies may be descriptive or explanatory. The latter type is used to
explore causation in order to find underlying principles. They may be prospective (in
which criteria are established and cases fitting the criteria are included as they become available) or retrospective (in which criteria are established for selecting cases
from historical records for inclusion in the study).

1.3.3 Analysis and Synthesis
The terms analysis and synthesis come from (classical) Greek and mean literally "to
loosen up" and "to put together" respectively. These terms are used within most
modern scientific disciplines -- from mathematics and logic to economy and psy-
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chology -- to denote similar investigative procedures. In general, analysis is defined
as the procedure by which we break down an intellectual or substantial whole into
parts or components. Synthesis is defined as the opposite procedure: to combine
separate elements or components in order to form a coherent whole.
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2 Laytime Clauses
2.1 Unfixed versus fixed
Most of the Voyage Charters (and sale and purchase contracts) will make a convention expressly of a fixed laytime to bind the part which is responsible for loading or
discharging that the operation must be complete within the time. To the owners, to do
this can let them make the voyage calculation more accurately. Or, it is difficult the
owners to know the length of the voyage since they have no idea that how long the
vessel will stay in the loading or discharging port.

2.1.1 Unfixed laytime
If there are not a convention of the fixed laytime in the charterparties or sales and
purchase contracts, the risk of losing time is on the owners. Provided, the charterers
complete the loading and discharging within a reasonable time, they are exclusive of
the breach. Their Implied responsibility is also like that.
Originally, as for the Law of Contract, anything without an express convention and
with a need of an explanation at the same time will bring the necessary of implied
terms which must be reasonable. Under the circumstances, if an officious bystander
come to ask the signing parties that can the loading and discharging last forever,
after all, these operations are completed by the cooperation of owners and charterers.
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Certainly, the answer is that even without the convention, the operations should be
complete within a reasonable time. That is the origin of the phrase “reasonable time”.
In this case, Burmester v. Hondgson (1810) 2 Camp.488, there was not a provision
of the laytime on the bill of lading in the transport contract. At last, the discharge
spent 63 days. Who should be responsible for the delay? Chief Justice Mansfield
said that
“Here the law could only raise an implied promise to … discharge the ship in the
usual customary time for unloading such a cargo. That has been rightly held to be the
time within which a vessel can be unloaded in turn, into the bonded warehouse. Such
time has not been exceeded by the defendant.”
In another case, Postlethwaite v. Freeland (1880) 5 App. Cas. 599, the relevant
vessel carried a shipment of steels to East London, South Africa. There was not a
convention of a fixed laytime in the charterparty either, but only said that “Cargo to be
discharge with all dispatch according to the custom of the port.” In the discharging
port of East London, the regular practice is that the vessel drop anchor outside the
port, then discharge the cargo to the barge, at last, the barge is dragged into the port
by manpower. The whole operation was operated by a private company. The company deal with the discharge in turn according to the order of the arrived ship. Only
the ship carrying mails have priority. The relevant vessel spent 31 working days to
complete discharge, because of, at that time, the lack of barge and port congestion.
But the House of Lords denied that the owners wanted to claim indemnity of demurrage against the charterers since there was not a convention of fixed laytime in the
charterparty. The House of Lords explicitly point out that the significant difference
between fixed and unfixed laytime. The Lord Sellborne said that
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“If, by the terms if the charterparty, he (charterer) has agreed to discharge it within a
fixed period of time, that is an absolute and, unconditional engagement, for the
non-performance of which he is answerable, whatever may be the nature of the impediments which prevent him from performing it and which cause the ship to be detained in his service beyond the time stipulated. If on the other hand, there is no fixed
time, the law implies an agreement on his part to discharge the cargo within a reasonable time…”
The “reasonable time” of loading bulk grain could be really different with steels. The
former should be faster, certainly, considering various situations like the facilities,
habits, weather and so on. So, the scale of the “reasonable time” can be really relaxed and instability. It is very difficult to succeed with testify the charterers that they
spent an “unreasonable time” to load and discharge.
Indeed, “reasonable time” should not concern with that the charterers cooperate
without reasonable diligence in order to complete the loading and discharging as
soon as possible.
As with the Lord Sellborne said that in this case, Postlethwaite v. Freeland (1880) 5
App. Cas. 599 (details see 2.1.1),
“Difficult questions may sometimes arise as to the circumstances which ought to be
taken into consideration in determining what time is reasonable. If (as in the present
case) an obligation, indefinite as to time, is qualified or partially defined by express or
arising from or out of that custom or practice, which the charterer could not have
overcome by the use of any reasonable diligence, ought (I think) to be taken into
consideration.”
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2.1.2 CQD (Customary Quick Dispatch)
How about the charterparty or sales and purchases contracts make a convention of
the laytime is CQD (Customary Quick Dispatch) or similar a convention without exactly how many days? The answer is that equal to unfixed time. Charterers have the
reasonable time to load and discharge.
In this case, Lyle Shipping Co. v. Cardiff Corporation (1900) 5 CC 397, the Justice
Romer said that
“The first question we have to consider is as to the meaning of the uncommon provision in a charterparty as to the ship being discharged ‘will dispatch as customary’. I
think it is now settled that such a provision means that the discharge shall take place
with all reasonable dispatch…”
It seems that although the CQD have two new words “quick d ispatch”, there is not
extra security to the owners.
In charterparty, the first word of CQD is “customary”. It is used for bind that the c ooperation between owners and charterers in the loading and discharging port under
the charterparty should be based on the customary practice of the port. Certainly,
CQD aims at the laytime. So the word “customary” aims at the method and operation
of loading and discharge. For example, to berth and use barge both are customary
practice of one kind of cargo in a port. Certainly, these two methods have different
speed. It seems that the charterers do not have to have a responsibility to choose a
faster method in order to dispatch the vessel.
In this case, Castlegate Steamship Co. v. Dempsey (1892) 1 QB 854, the Justice Fry
said that
“They, therefore, primarily refer to manner of discharge, and secondly only to time.
They are not entirely disconnected with time, because the dispatch is to be in the
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customary manner, and that manner may be one which expedites or delays the
discharge of the cargo.”
In another case, Akites Glittre v. Gabrvel, Wade & English (1926) 24 Lloyd’s Rep.
372, the Justice Roche said that
“The words in the charterparty ‘as customary’ refer, in my opinion, exclusively to the
method of loading and not to the time of loading.”
It seems that, it is OK no matter the charterers choose which kind of method especially in “FIO” (free in and out) which the charterers (including consignors/consignees)
is in charge of loading and discharge.
Nowadays, the situation that there are two or more method of loading and discharge
in a port should be rare. But there may be two or more customary berth for one kind
of cargo in a port. If one of those berths is unavailable (because of occupied by another vessel or short of draft due to tide) when a vessel is going to berth. Thus, if the
charterers/consignors/consignees stick to wait until this berth is available instead of
using the other customary berth. Unless they have enough evidence that using the
other berth could bring more severe damage, they should compensate the owners
for damage for detention.

2.1.3 Fixed laytime
Again, if both parties did not make a convention a fixed laytime in the charterparty,
the Common Law only can imply a reasonable time for loading and discharging. On
the contrary, if there is a fixed laytime, the party which is in charge of loading or
discharge have to complete within that time. Originally, the acceptance in charterparty is strict and absolutely responsible, unless there are other clauses that make
disclaimer or exemption.
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In this case, William Alexander & Sons v. Aktieselskabet Dampskabet Hensa and
others (1919) 25 CC 13, the Lord Hunter said that
“It is well settled that where an merchant has undertaken to discharge a ship within a
fixed number of days he is liable in demurrage for any delay of the ship beyond that
period unless such delay is attributable to the fault of the shipowner or those for
whom he is responsible. The risk of delay from causes for which neither of the contracting parties is responsible is with the merchant.”
How to calculate the laytime separately or altogether, largely, based on the contract.
There is usually one fixed loading time and one fixed discharge time in one charterparty in dry bulk. Thus, the loading time of every loading port should be calculated
altogether once. If the loading spends up the fixed loading laytime, charterers should
compensate for the demurrage. They cannot use the fixed discharge laytime (if there
is rest) to hedge the loading laytime or reduce the responsibility of demurrage because they are calculated separately unless there is other express convention.
As for tanker, the operation of loading and discharge are usually faster than dry bulk
and without the situation that the sellers and buyers calculate their laytime and demurrage themselves (FOB or CIF). Both reasons above bring about a result that a
tanker charterparty usually has only one total fixed laytime, such as 72 running hours.
If loading spend up 72 hours, then commence to calculate demurrage while the
vessel arrive at the discharge port.
Either dry bulk or oil, loading is usually faster than discharge. So, loading laytime is
shorter than discharge laytime. For example, loading laytime is 3 days, and discharge laytime is 5 days. Certainly, nowadays, it is very rare to make a convention so
simple but with what kind of days and more and more complicated.
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2.2 “Days”
The words of fixed laytime are bizarre because of the freedom of contract. The party
which is unfamiliar is very easy to be tricked. If all the convention is “3 days for
loading, 5 days for discharge”, there will be not so many lawsuits and Justices, arbitrators and lawyers. In practice, the writings are various. For example, only the “days”
can be written as “calendar days”, “running days”, “consecutive days”, “conventional
days”, “working days”, “weather working days”, “weather permitting”, “working days
of 24 hours”, “working day of 24 consecutive hours”, “weather permitting working
days”, etc.. Thus, are their meanings different? And what are the differences?

2.2.1 Working days
If the fixed laytime is written as “days”, “running days” or “calendar days”, even there
is 24 hours in that day. If a day that there is neither loading nor discharge in a port,
for example, holidays or Sundays, Chinese Spring Festival, Christmas, etc., the
charterers cannot use to loading or discharging, but that day is still counted as laytime, the charterers must feel unfair. Because they buy the fixed laytime with freight
rate should be the actual loading and discharging laytime. There are more and more
“working days” in charterparty at the end of 20 century. For example, the laytime is 3
working days. Thus, the laytime excludes Sundays and holidays.
The definition of “working days” is in this case, Nielsen & Co. v. Wait, James & Co.
(1885) 16 QBD 67, the Lord Esher said that (aims at London)
“… but working days in England are not the same as working days in foreign ports,
because working days in England, by the custom and habits of the English, if not by
their law, do not include Sundays. In a foreign port working days may not include
saints’ days, and then working days do not include saints’ days. If by the custom of
the port certain days in the year are holidays, so the no work is done in that port on
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those days, then working days do not include those days. Working days in an English
charterparty, if there nothing to show a contrary intention, do not include Christmas
Days and some other days, which are well known to be holidays. Therefore, ‘working
days’ mean days on which, at the port, according to the custom of the port, work is
done in loading and unloading ships, and the phrase does not include Sundays.”
London and the vast majority of ports around the world do not work on Sundays. But
the customary is not just the same. For example, that is Friday in Muslim countries.
So, in this case, The Vancouver Strikes Cases (1963) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 12, the Lord
Devlin said that
“But there may, of course, be days in some ports, such as the Mohammedan Friday,
which are not working days and yet cannot well be described as Sundays or holidays.”
In addition, there are some ports in some countries that work on Sundays even
without charge for overtime. So, Sunday is a working day. Thus, in order to avoid
disputes, many charterparties and contracts not only have a laytime clause written as
working days, but also exclude expressly Sundays and holidays again and again. For
example, “(how many) working days, Sundays and holidays excluded”.

2.2.1.1 Working Hours
There are various working hours on a working day in every port, such as 8 hours, 12
hours, even 24 hours. That had brought different viewpoints.
On the one hand, a working day only aims at the character of the day. That means a
day with common work is a working day in the port. A working day is unacted on
working hours. To this viewpoint, in this case, British and Mexico Shipping Co. Ltd v.
Lockett Brothers & Co. Ltd (1911) 1 KB 264, the Lord Devlin said that
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“’working day’ in this charterparty means something contradistinguished from days
which are not working days, a day of work as distinguished from days for play or rest;
and I think it is immaterial whether the days for play or rest are so for secular or religious reasons, and whether they are so by the ancient authority of the Church or by
the present authority of the state …”
On the other hand, a working day is affected by working hours.
In this case, Nielsen & Co. v. Wait, James & Co. (1885) 16 QBD 67, the Lord Esher
said that
“Now ‘working days’ if that term is used in the charterparty, will vary in different ports;
‘working days’ in the Port of London are not the same as working days in some other
ports, even in England; …”
In the other case, in Court of Appeal, the “Rubystone” (1955) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 9, the
Lord Goddard said that
“… I venture to think that if you say to a workman or to an employer of workmen:
‘What is your working day? How many hours is your working day?’ they would not
say: ‘Twenty-four hours’. That is not the working day; you are asleep for a good part
of the 24 hours. To say a working day is a period of 24 hours seems to me to ignore
entirely the fact that the word ‘working’ qualifies the word ‘day’ and cuts it down …”
There is not effect from those two different viewpoints to a port which work 24 hours.
But if a port only works 8 hours per day, the second viewpoint will becomes that one
actual working day equals to 3 calendar days (8+8+8=24). That will bring a huge effect to most of ports. But this latter viewpoint had been negatived specifically in The
Vancouver Strike Cases. The Lord Devlin summed up that
“First, I conclude with respect that it is contrary to all authority before 1955 to say that
a working day is a calendar day cut down. ‘Working’ does not define a part of a day
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but describes the character of a day as a whole. Secondly, I conclude that the character of a day as a working day cannot be determined by inquiring whether on that
day or on a part of it work was done at standard rates. There is no established authority for that view which I think stems from the misconception that the ‘working day’
of the laytime clause has something to do with the hours of the day during which the
ship can be compelled to work …”

2.2.1.2 Saturdays
Saturdays are usually counted as working days. Not a few place including European
and American ports work half of the day on Saturdays, although, possibly with
charge for overtime. That will not affect that Saturday is a working day. In this case,
London Arbitration in LMLN No. 465 (1997), held that
“… There were two considerations which militated against the proposition that Saturday mornings should not count against laytime. The first was that in almost the
whole of the Western world nowadays, Saturdays were non-working days (at least
for the bulk of the population); yet they were no commonly regarded as being ‘holidays’ in any country. The second was that the relevant charter exceptions frequently
(as in present case) pointed up a distinction between Saturdays on the one hand and
holidays on the other.
To amount to a holiday, a day had to be determined as such by law or as a matter of
custom …”
Thus, the charterers who cannot make full use of Saturdays will feel unfair. Because
the working hours are usually shorter than the weekdays’, the protective practices
are including the follows:
1)

Expressly write on the charterparty that Saturday noon till Monday 8 a.m. not to

count as laytime;

17

2)

Add a Baltimore Form C Saturday Clause in the charterparty.

The partly excerpts of the Baltimore Form C Saturday Clause are as follow:
“(1) Notwithstanding any custom of the port to the contrary Saturday shall not count
as laytime at loading and discharging port or ports where stevedoring labour and/or
grain handling facilities are unavailable on Saturday or available only at overtime
and/or premium rates.
(2) In ports where only part of Saturday is affected by such conditions, as described
under ‘1’ above, laytime shall count until the expiration of the last straight time period.
(3) Where six or more hours of work are performed at normal rates, Saturday shall
count as a full layday.”

2.2.1.3 Holidays
If the fixed laytime is written as “working days”, that generally (but not always) excludes the Sundays and holidays. So, sometimes it will repeat that “Sunday and Holiday Excepted (SHEX)”, and that will be Friday in Muslim countries.
The “SHEX” is a description of the fixed laytime. It becomes the day is no longer relevant in whether loading or discharge there. If the day is holiday, it will not turn into
working day due to the charterers use it to loading or discharge. If the owners want to
count the day as laytime but not manipulated by the charterers, they must add “unless used, if used, actual time to count” into the charterparty.

2.2.2 Weather working days
This kind of days requires that not only there is common loading and discharge operation in the port, but also there is a good weather. The charterers are still afraid of
the bad weather. Although the tanker generally do not worry about the bad weather
(but not always, there may be the situation that the stormy waves are too big to berth).
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But the operations of most cargo are affected by the various bad weathers. Thus, the
charterers will stick to make a convention that the laytime must be written as
“weather working day” in order to be entitled to have the actual laytime.

2.2.2.1 Good Weather
The definition of a good weather is very wide. In general, bad weather means rain,
but also snow, stormy waves, freeze (The “Sydhavet” [1931] 41 Lloyd’s Rep. 160),
typhoon (The “Rubystone” [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 9), etc. Certainly, the bad weather
must affect the loading or discharging in contemplation, and then the day is not a
weather working day. Therefore, operating the ore sand is not affected by light driz zle, so the day is still a weather working day for ore sand. But it is not a weather
working day for the wet sensitive cargo in the same port. Similarly, if it is not a
weather working day for the operation in roads because of big stormy waves, but it is
a weather working day for the operation of the vessel in berth.

2.2.2.2 Fear of Weather
For the operation of relevant cargo, that is either good weather or bad weather. But
not it is good weather at that time and the day is counted as non-weather working
day due to afraid of bad weather. For example, it was not rain at that time, but the
weather was unstable, and the charterers were afraid of rain or typhoon. The time of
fear of weather actually do not affect that it is good weather at that time. It allows
operating the relevant cargo. Especially, the fear of weather concerns the safety of
the vessel but not the operations. In this case, The “Maria G” (1958) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
616, the port authority ordered the vessel stopped discharging to leave because of
the coming bore tide in order to protect the docks. The time loss still counted as
weather working day. The Justice Devlin said that
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“But no case has been cited to me in which a mere threat of bad weather which has
suspended loading has been held to make a day not a weather working day, and
certainly no case where the threat of bad weather has affected not the operation of
the actual work of loading, but the safety of the ship in the particular place in which
she was … I should decide against it (argument from the charterers) on the broad
ground that, if the effect of weather is not to interfere with the operations of the
loading and discharging, but is to render the presence of the vessel in a particular
place unsafe, the time so load is not what the parties contemplate when they are
referring to weather working days.”
But if the bad weather not only affect the safety of vessels but also the operations in
berth, then the day of the latter reason can be counted as non-weather working day.
For example, typhoon can make the vessel cannot berth safely. And although it has
berthed, still cannot load or discharge. In this case, Gebr. Broere v. Saras (1982) 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 436, the authority closed the port due to the bad weather. The vessels
were not only cannot loading or discharging, but also have to leave. The Justice
Parker judged that the charterers win over, and said that
“… laytime will be interrupted if the weather is such that it would both have prevented
loading and required the vessel to leave has she been in berth.”
About the “weather working day”, Mr. John Schofield has made a good conclusion as
follow:
“A weather working day is a type of working day. It is a working day on which the
weather allows the particular ship in question to load or discharge cargo of the type
parties intend her to so load or discharge. If she is not in such a position but is still
awaiting her turn to berth, then it will be counted as a weather working day if the
weather would allow that type of cargo to be worked at the berth where the parties
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intend the vessel to go. It is immaterial whether work is intended on the particular
day.” (Laytime and Demurrage, vol. 5, John Schofield, 2.41)
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3 Commencement of Laytime
3.1 Condition 1: arrived ship
One of the condition precedents is that the vessel arrived at the conventional place in
the charterparty. That is a simple principle. Certainly, if the vessel do not arrive at the
conventional place for loading or discharge because of the charterers’ mistakes, that
is another story. It concerns claim indemnity, but not whether the laytime commence
to count. These mistakes can be that the charterers have not reasonable diligence to
provide berth (Robert H Dahl v. Nelson Donkin and others (1880) 6 App Cas 38, The
“Lizzie” (1919) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 529), or the charterers do not prepare the cargo (The
“Aello” (1960) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 623).
Certainly, under the freedom of contract, there is usually a convention about the
commencement of laytime. Thus, to commence the laytime must be strictly according to the charterparty, even though the convention is not reasonable. But, unless
there is a realizing convention else, the original definition of “arrived ship” need to
connect to the operations of loading and discharge.
First of all, since emphasize the freedom of contract, means that the vessel arrive at
what place according to the charterparty. In general, the place is a berth of a port
what is called “berth charter”. In practical charter business, it is the most to see the
“berth charter”. For example, the loading port is one safe berth, Shanghai. This example shows that the charterers appoint a befitting berth, at lease it is within the port
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of Shanghai. Usually, the charterers cannot confirm which berth to use in the discharging port when they sign the charterparty. The berth may be appointed by consignor or the agent of consignee, but more possibly by the port authority. And, there
are several berths for the relevant cargo in, for example, the port of Shanghai. But
sometimes, there is only a port (loading or discharging) in the convention what is
called “port charter”. For example, the loading port is Shanghai.

3.1.1 Berth charter
Obviously, the arrival must be that the vessel arrives at one berth in the conventional
port. The berth can be not only fixed in charterparty, but also appointed afterwards
within a reasonable time by charterers via consignors, consignees or the port authority. The berth is similar to which was fixed in charterparty before as soon as it is
appointed. The both parties have no right to change any longer, unless the charterers consent.
There is a case about berth charter, The “Trado” (1982) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 157. The
details are as follow:
“By a charter-party dated Apr. 25, 1981, the defendant owners let their vessel Trado
to the plaintiff charterers for a period of six months, the last date for redelivery being
Nov. 24. The charter provided inter alia:
… Charterers' option further 6 months to be declared 60 days in advance 20 days
more or less in charterers' option on final period …
By a memorandum of agreement dated Aug. 12, the owners agreed to sell the vessel
to the buyers, and cl. 21 of that agreement provided inter alia:
Vessel to be delivered at Singapore October/December 1981 unless the … charterers … exercise their option by the 5th September, 1981, to extend the … charter by
another 6 … months. If such option is exercised … buyers to be notified by sellers
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without delay and buyers on their part to have the option to declare within 48 working
hours after receipt of such notification that this Memorandum of Agreement shall be
considered null and void …
On Aug. 25, the charterers sent a telex to the owners stating thatWe are pleased to inform you that charterers decided to lift the 6 months option …
The owners sent the following telex in reply:
… We would very much appreciate if you would reconfirm to us in order to clear away
any possible misunderstandings that the charterers have waived their option to extend the charter-party by another six months.
In reply the charterers stated that… We confirm that charterers have waived their option to extend the charterparty
another six months …
The owners immediately notified the buyers and in their telex stated that it would be
more convenient if not necessary to reach an agreement for delivery of the vessel at
Singapore, November 1981/January 1982.
By an originating summons the charterers applied to the Court for a declaration that
the option had been validly exercised. ”
Just as the Justice Parker said that
“It is clear law that if a charterer has an option as to port, berth, method of loading
and so on that option, once exercised, is binding and is as if written into the charter
party, berth or means of loading, as the case may be.”
The Lord Diplock appointed out the legal status of a berth charter in this case, The
“Johanna Oldendorff” (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285, as follow:
“Where a single berth was specified in the charter-party as being the place of loading
or of discharge, the loading voyage or the carrying voyage did not end until the
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vessel was at that very berth. Until then no obligation could lie upon the charterer to
load the cargo, or to receive it, as the case might be. If the specified berth were occupied by other shipping, the vessel was still at the voyage stage while waiting in the
vicinity of the berth until it became available, and time so spent was at the shipowner’s expense.”
Thus, that must be a disadvantage to the owners, since, nowadays, most of the risk
of severe delays are caused by the berth congestions which make vessels cannot
berth the conventional berth, and taken by the owners due to the vessel is not arrive
at the conventional destination as though there is a delay because of a storm or
passing the Panama Canal halfway of the voyage. Then, in this specific voyage, the
owners can only receive a fixed freight from the charterers without any extra fee due
to the delay.
Therefore, the berth charters are often seen nowadays, but rare of them neither be
added in some clauses in order to bring forward the commencement of laytime nor
use the other way to shift the risk of berth congestion to the charterers, for example,
“whether in berth or not”,” time lost waiting for berth to count as laytime” or to appoint
a berth which is” reachable on her arrival”, etc..

3.1.2 Port charter
Comparing with the “berth charter”, there is no necessary that the vessel must arrive
at the berth in the “port charter”. It is enough to arrive at the port limits. Thus, the
vessel only needs to arrive at the anchorage or the lay-by berth. That could be
deemed to the vessel arrives at the conventional place. The laytime can be commenced to calculate without stop, unless there are targeted exceptions or delay by
owners’ own mistakes. That means that the risk of loss of time of port congestion is
responded by the charterers.
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Hundred years ago, there was mainly no problem that vessels arrived at the port
range at the end of voyage. So, the port charter had no risk of delay. Even had, that
only occur in berth charter which the geographical position is more limited. Due to the
fact that, at that time, there were not so many vessels, big body and many trades as
those today. Anyway, all above are reflected in few port congestions. Thus, even
though the vessel had to wait berth, it could wait in the anchorage or lay-by berth
which was near the berth in the port. In addition, at that time, there were risks even
though the vessel sailing along the navigation channel such as crash or stranding.
And it is unreasonable to be responded the risk by charterers. The last reason was
that, at that time, it is difficult to communicate between shore and vessels. Unless the
vessel was waiting in commercial area near the berth so that, at the worst, they could
go on board to notice masters by boats, or there would be difficult communicate and
delay when there was an available berth and the charterers wanted to notice the
master to weigh anchor to berth and to prepare loading or discharging. So, at the
beginning, the law status was that the destination was the commercial area in the
port.
The first case about that was Leonis v. Rank (1908) 1 K. B. 499 of the Court of Appeal. Details were that the vessel arrived at the loading port of Bahia Blanca, Argentina. The vessel arrived at the river channel which was near the dock the charterers
going to loading and she was waiting for availability. There was evidence that it was
allowed to load and discharge along the river channel, but the important thing is it
can have a business activities. The Justice Kennedy of the Court of Appeal had the
famous court verdict as follow:
“It is when the stipulated point of destination is a port only without further limitation,
as in the present case, that a question as to the fact of the ship’s arrival at her des-
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tination is likely to arise. The limits of a port established by law or ancient custom
may be very wide; or, again, in the case of a newly established place of shipping
traffic, the limits may be uncertain because they not yet defined by any competent
authority … In the case of a port, and nothing more, being designated in a charterparty as the point of destination our Courts have acted in accordance with those
dictates of reason and practical expediency which ought to be paramount especially
in the region of mercantile business. Just as a port may have one set of limits, if
viewed geographically, and another for fiscal or for pilotage purposes, so when it is
named in a commercial document, and for commercial purposes, the term is to be
construed in a commercial sense in relation to the objects of the particular transac tion … But then comes the question what does the expression the ‘port’ viewed
commercially, or the ‘commercial area’ in this connection mean? Certainly it does not
mean the loading berth, that is to say, the actual spot at which the work of loading or
unloading the ship is performed … The commercial area of a port, arrival within
which makes the ship an arrived ship and, as such, entitled to give notice of readiness to load, and at the expiration of the notice to begin to count lay days, ought, I
think to be that area of the named port of destination on arrival within which the
master can effectively place his ship at the disposal of the charterer, the vessel
herself being then, so far as she is concerned, ready to load, and as near as circumstances permit to the actual loading ‘spot’ … be it quay or wharf, or pier, or
mooring, and in a place where ships waiting for access to that spot usually lie, or, if
there be more such loading spots than one, as near as circumstances permit to that
one of such spots which the charterer prefers.”
The “Aello” (1960) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 623, was another case about the “arrived ship”
must arrive at the commercial area in port charter after the 1950s, although, at that
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time, the port limits had been expanded a lot. The vessel was going to load corns at
the port of Buenos Aires, Argentina. But she had to drop anchor and wait in the Intersection, 22 miles away the dock, because of port congestion. The Intersection is a
legal and administrative limit belonging to Buenos Aires. The securities, navigation,
taxation there and so on are in charged by the port of Buenos Aires. But there was no
operation of loading or discharge. It was out of the question of commercial area.
This case was appealed to the House of Lords. But the House of Lords did not take
this opportunity to deviate or expand the definition of “arrived ship” under port charter
in Leonis v. Rank (1908) 1 K. B. 499. For example, the place must be a place with
operation of loading and discharge. The Lord Jenkins said that
“… the ‘commercial area’ of the port, that is to say, the area in which the actual
loading spot is to be found and to which vessels seeking to load cargo of the relevant
description usually go, and in which the business of loading such cargo is usually
carried out. The area presumed to be intended by the hypothetical owner and charterer is further particularized in point of proximity to the actual loading spot as the
disposal of the charterer, and the position of the ship in which is to be as near as
circumstances permit to the actual loading spot and on a place where ships waiting
for access to that spot usually lie. The judgment, as I think, clearly postulate as the
‘commercial area’ a physical area capable (though, no doubt, only within broad limits)
of identification on a map. When the given ship enters that area and positions herself
within it in accordance with the requirements just states, she is (in point of geographical position) an arrived ship; until she does so, she is not an arrived ship, and
lay days and demurrage are to be calculated accordingly.”
But there was someone did not agree with that judgement, the Lord Radcliffe said
that
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“It seems to me that, if we are loading for a general test of an ‘arrived ship’ applicable
to all ports with their great varieties of structure, formation and local condition, it is un
wise to identify the ‘commercial area’ too closely with the idea of a fixed geographical
limit.”
That was the actual situation in 1960, which is different from the Leonis v. Rank in
1900 including the bigger and bigger vessels that very difficult to berth at once while
there were few enough berths for the big vessels inside the ports. Thus vessels had
to wait in roads far away from the berths and totally out of the question of commercial
area. In addition, there was no specific commercial area in many ports. Thus, actually, that leaded to that there were not any differences between port charter and berth
charter.
With dissatisfied to the “Aello” (1960) case, the Justice Roskill said that in The “Delian Spirit” (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 506,
“… It is now over 12 years since The Aello was finally decided. It is widely known that
it was not a popular decision either in St. Mary Axe or in the Temple. It is also widely
known that its application has from time to time caused difficulty not only to brokers
but also to arbitrators and umpires and indeed to Judges …”
There was an unstable judgement in The “Delian Spirit” case. The vessel was going
to load crude oil in Tuapse, Black Sea. She arrived at roads on 19 th February, 1964
and tendered NOR. There were 1.25 miles and a breakwater between the roads and
the berth. The vessel waited until berth on 24th February. The relevant charterparty
was a port charter because there was no expressly berth mentioned as follow:
“1. - [The vessel shall] … sail … to One or two safe ports SOVEIT BLACK SEA, at
Charterers’ option … and there load … a full and complete cargo of Crude Oil …”
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One of the disputes between both parties is whether the ship already was an “arrived
ship” when she was in roads. In arbitration, the arbitrator was the famous Lord Mustill.
He judged that the roads were the legal, fiscal and administrative area in the port of
Tuapse. But it was out of the commercial area due to it was impossible to load crude
oil there. Although the Lord Mustill sympathize owners, he judged that the vessel was
not arrived. In other words, the owners would respond the time loss from 19 th to 24th
February. Ordinarily, this was the verification of the facts. Even to appeal, the court
should be unable to overturn.
But the case was appealed to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The judgement was overturned unanimously. In the High Court, the Justice Donaldson said
that
“Unfortunately the authoritative view of the law has changed since 1957. I say ‘unfortunately’ because the law as it now appears to be is that a ship is only arrived
when she is in ‘that part of the port when a ship can be loaded with the relevant cargo
when a berth is available, albeit she cannot be loaded until a berth is available’ (see
Scrutton, 17th ed. [1964], at p. 124).
Such a rule is much more difficult to apply because it involves a decision on whether
the waiting place is in the same or a different part of the port from that in which the
loading or discharging berths lie. Ports usually have established positions in which
ships wait for discharging berths. They are in the most convenient place in the interest of all concerned, bearing in mind such considerations as potential congestion
of the fairways, ease of communication with the shore and the safety of the vessels
in widely varying weather conditions. They may be relatively near to or far away from
the discharging spots, depending upon local topographical features. … But whether
or not the waiting positions and the discharging spots can fairly be said to be within
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the same part of the port is wholly without commercial significance if, as is usually the
case, the waiting positions are established in places where the vessels can effectively and immediately be placed at the disposal of the charterers …”
In addition, the Lord Denning explained that
“I propose to consider first when the Delian Spirit became an ‘arrived ship’ in the
technical sense. We have been referred to the two leading cases, Leonis Steamship
Company Ltd. v. Rank Ltd., [1908] 1 K.B. 499, and Sociedad Financiera de Bienes
Raices S.A. v. Agrimpex Hungarian Trading Company for Agricultural Products (The
Aello), [1961] A.C. 135; [1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 623. Their facts are illuminating. The
Leonis arrived at Bahia Blanca. She could not get to the jetty; she had to wait a few
ships' lengths off, because there were other vessels alongside. It was held by the
Court of Appeal that, although she was not actually at the berth, she was nevertheless an ‘arrived ship’, having arrived within the commercial area of the port. In contrast, the Aello was due to go to Buenos Aires, but the nearest she could get was 22
miles away down the River Plate. She had to wait her turn there because she was
not allowed to go up the river to Buenos Aires as there was no cargo ready for her.
There was only one channel up the river. The House of Lords held that she was not
an ‘arrived ship’. She had not got within the commercial area of the port.
The present case seems to me to fall within the Leonis and not the Aello. The Delian
Spirit had put down anchor as near as she possibly could get to the jetty where she
had to go. The only reason she could not get in was because the berths were all
occupied by other tankers at the time. She waited at the allotted customary and usual
place for tankers waiting to get in. It was the only place. She was not allowed to wait
inside the breakwater. She waited within a distance of 114 miles from the jetty. She
herself gave notice of readiness. Applying the classic test of Lord Justice Kennedy in
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the case of Leonis Steamship Company Ltd. v. Rank, [1908] 1 K.B., at p. 521, the
master had effectively placed.
… his ship at the disposal of the charterer, the vessel herself being then, so far as
she is concerned, ready to load, and as near as circumstances permit to the actual
loading ‘spot’ … and in a place where ships waiting for access … usually lie …”
The problem was that the explanation above was based on the requirement that the
vessel must arrive at commercial area. But there was no any explanation about the
fact that the roads were not commercial area of the port of Tuapse verified by the
arbitrator. By rights, the High Court and the Court of Appeal should not be able to
escape from verifying this fact. So, it was not the way to deem that the vessel already
arrived at a place without any closer to the berth only due to sympathize the owners.
Anyway, the result of this case had made the shipping industry did not know what to
do in this aspect.
The unclear and limited positions in this aspect in English Law had no chance to
change until this case, The “Johanna Oldendorff” (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285. The
vessel was carried a ship of bulk grain from America to Liverpool and Birkenhead,
England. These two ports lie on the opposite sides of the Mersey River. If the vessel
has to wait berthing, she must drop anchor to wait in the Mersey Bar anchorage in
estuary about 17 miles away from the commercial areas of these two ports. The
vessel arrived at the anchorage on 2nd January, 1968 and ordered to drop anchor
and wait there by the port authority. She tendered NOR on the same day, and left the
anchorage to berth and discharge on 20th January. The dispute was that whether she
was an “arrived ship” when the vessel arrived at Mersey Bar anchorage and it concerned the 17/18 days of delay from 2nd to 20th January were responded by owners
or charterers. Mersey Bar anchorage was not only the customary waiting anchorage
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of Liverpool and Birkenhead, but also the appointed anchorage by the port authority.
But it was not the commercial area just since there were no operations of loading or
discharge. But there was legislation that the Mersey Bar anchorage was in the legal
limits of port of Liverpool. The verification of the facts given by the arbitration court is
as follow:
“The seaward limits of the port of Liverpool were not in 1968 legally defined. They
were defined in the Mersey Docks and Harbour Act, 1971, cap. 57, by which the
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board was converted into a company. In that definition
the westwards limit is a line running North and South through the place where the
North West lightship is stationed a considerable distance to the west of the Bar anchorage. Section 8 of that Act imposes the duty on the company of taking such action
as it considers necessary or desirable for or incidental to the maintenance, opera tion
and improvement of the conservancy of the port of Liverpool and the approaches
thereto.”
The case was appealed to the House of Lords, and the judgement was that the
vessel was counted as arrived at Liverpool and Birkenhead when she arrived at the
Mersey Bar anchorage due to it was in the limits of both ports. The House of Lords
did not limit the port limits within commercial area any longer. The Lord Reid cleared
the definition of “arrived ship” in port charter, which was the famous “Reid Test” as
follow:
“Before a ship can be said to have arrived at a port she must if she cannot proceed
immediately to a berth, have reached a position within the port where she is at the
immediate and effective disposition of the charter. If she is at a place where waiting
ships lie, she will be in such a position unless in some extraordinary circumstances
proof of which would lie on the charterer …
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If the ship is waiting at some other place in the port then it will be for the owner to
prove that she is as fully at the disposition of the charterer as she would have been if
in the vicinity of the berth for loading or discharging.”
Obviously, that was a legal precedent that keeps abreast of time, and fits the demands of this aspect from shipping industry. But the only one still existing limit was
that it required vessels within the port. The House of Lords did not think that it was
difficult to identify whether she was within or outside the port. But actually, there are
ports or situations like that. The following is the parlance about that there was no difficulty in this aspect from the Lord Reid.
“But I find it difficult to believe that there would, except perhaps in rare cases, be any
real difficulty in deciding whether at any particular port the usual waiting place was or
was not within the port. The area within which a port authority exercises its various
powers can hardly be difficult to ascertain. Some powers with regard to pilotage and
other matters may extend far beyond the limits of the port. But those which regulate
the movements and conduct of ships would seem to afford a good indication; and in
many cases the limits of the port are defined by law.”
The last sentence above was used to test whether the vessel was within or outside
the port by some London arbitrations.
It is thus clear that there was problem still in the “Reid Test”, and it was difficult to
satisfy the shipping industry. It was difficult to understand that why cannot simply to
locate a conventional destination port, and then, the vessel counted as an “arrived
ship” as soon as she arrived at a customary place for waiting to berth and could not
go forward any more. Why still nitpick whether the place is within or outside the port
divided artificially.
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The status of “Reid Test” in English Law, at present, cannot be denied. And it is very
difficult to have a chance to appeal to the Court of Appeal to make the little relaxation
under the Arbitration Law, 1996. It seems that the party can only rely on expressed
clauses.

3.1.3 Bring Forward the Commencement of Laytime by Expressed
Clauses
Although owners and charterers agree on a port charter, and there was a relaxation
that no longer required the vessel must arrive at the commercial area in this case,
The “Johanna Oldendorff” (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285, under English Law. There is
still the situation that the customary anchorage for waiting to berth is outside the legal
limits of the port. For example, there are several ports in one river, but the customary
anchorage is in the estuary which belongs to none of the ports. Under the circumstances, the owners still needs an expressed clause to bring forward the commencement of laytime. There are mainly 3 types of these expressly clauses:
1)

To allow to tender NOR and commence the laytime in advance;

2)

To explain that the time waiting for berth is responded by charterers (without

location limit);
3)

To make a convention that the charterers should pay for the time waiting for

berth, for example, 20,000 dollars a day.

3.1.3.1 The “waiting for berth” clause in Norgrain
Norgrain was available in 1973 and commonly used soon. There may be some important reasons including the frequency and importance in bulk grain transportation
in North America, and the clauses were considerate and against new problems.
There was a clause 17(b) about the situation of waiting for berth in 1973 format as
follow:

35

“(b) Waiting for Berth
If the vessel is prevented from entering the commercial limits of the loading/discharging port(s) because the first or sole loading/discharging berth or a lay
berth or anchorage is not available, or on the order of the Charterers/Receivers or
any competent official body or authority, and the Master warrants that the vessel is
physically ready in all respects to load or discharge, the time spent waiting at a usual
waiting place outside the commercial limits of the port or off the port shall count
against laytime. Such laytime shall count from vessel’s arrival at such usual waiting
place and will continue to run …. If after entering the commercial limits if the loading
port, vessel fails to pass inspections … and requires more than four hours SHINC to
pass such inspections from the time of initial failure to pass the time spent waiting
outside the commercial limits of the port as per lines shall not count … but if said
vessel passes inspections within four hours any delay in commencing loading directly attributable to its failure to pass initial inspections shall not be counted as laytime on demurrage.”
The idea of this clause, certainly, first of all, was in order to bring forward the commencement of laytime. But there was a only one disadvantage that they did not know,
at that time, there were not the parlance about “commercial area” any longer and it
was extended to the legal limits of port from the case, The “Johanna Oldendorff”
(1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 285. Obviously, the parlance should be updated.
Next one aimed at a situation only faced in bulk grain. The holds must be strict clean
and without incompact rust and paint and pass the inspections before loading because the grain is for eat. The inspections are done by National Cargo Bureau (NCB)
and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). But the inspections only do after berth and before loading. That brings a London Arbitration in LMLN No. 299
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(1991). A vessel was going to load a ship of bulk grain in port of Ama, Mississippi
River. She waited for berth at the estuary of Mississippi River 42miles away the port
of Ama and tendered a NOR on 5th, May. The NCB/USDA inspector went on board to
inspect on 6th, and pass 6 Holds except No.5 due to the ballast water. That leaded to
that the charterers rejected the NOR. The owner pumped the ballast water and was
reinspected and passed on 7th, and the Master tendered NOR again and accepted by
charterer. The time for pumping the water was longer than 4 hours.
The charterer said that the NOR tendered on 5th was not accuracy because the time
for pumping water was longer than 4 hours, and the 2/3 days from 5th to 7th were not
counted as the time of waiting for berth. As the result, the arbitration court judged that
the owner won.
This result seems fair from the surface reported facts. But it rang the alarm bell that
the 4 hours were too short and very risky for owners. So, the Norgrain updated in
1989. The new clause is as follow:
“(b) Waiting for Berth outside Port Limits
It the vessel is prevented from entering the limits of the loading/discharging port(s)
because the first or sole loading/discharging berth or a lay berth or anchorage is not
available within the port limits, or on the order of the Charterers/Receivers or any
competent official body or authority, and the Master warrants that the vessel is physically ready in all respects to load or discharge, the Master may tender vessels notice
of readiness, by radio if desired, from usual anchorage outside limits of the port,
whether in free pratique or not, whether customs cleared or not. If after entering the
limits of the loading port, vessel fails to pass inspections as per Clause 18(e) any
time so lost shall not count as laytime or time on demurrage from the time vessel fails
inspections until she is passed, but if this delay in obtaining, said passes exceeds 24
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running hours shex all time spent waiting outside the limits of the port shall not
count.”
It seems that, in this aspect, Norgrain is fair to owners and charterers.

3.1.3.2 Whether WIBON make a berth charter change into a port
charter
This point is not so lucidity. It is not so different in practice. Because usually the
vessel have to wait in anchorage inside the port since the relevant berth is unavailable. WIBON can be applied to protect the owners to commence the laytime. But if the
berth unavailable is due to something about weather or sailing such as dense fog or
lack of tug, this problem will bring disputes. Because if WIBON changes a berth
charter into a port charter, the vessel can tender NOR in anchorage, then no matter
the delay is caused by weather or sailing problem, all the time is counted as laytime
unless there is expressed exceptions. But if WIBON only applied on the unavailable
berth, the charter is essentially a berth charter, and never become a port charter.
Thus, the risk of unavailable berth due to weather or sailing problems is still on the
owner, because under berth charter, to solve these problems is the owner’s responsibility.
The unclearness was shown in this case, The “Johanna Oldendorff” (1972) 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 292. The Justice Buckley said that
“Whether it (WIBON) is right to say that the effect of the insertion in such a case is to
make the operation of the charter the same as a port charter, so that the ship should
be treated as ‘arrived’ although she has not berthed, or whether the insertion merely
advances the time from which lay days run notwithstanding that the ship may not
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technically have arrived, perhaps does not much matter. The latter seems to me to
be probably the more correct view.”
Besides, the Justice Roskill said that
“The phrase ‘whether in berth or not’ was designed to convert a berth charter-party
into a port charter-party and to ensure that under a berth charter-party notice of
readiness could be given as soon as the ship had arrived within the commercial area
of the port concerned so that laytime would start to run on its expiry. It has no proper
place in a port charter-party.”
The dispute did not clear until this case, The “Kyzikos” (1989) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, in the
House of Lords. The vessel carried steel from Italy to Houston, America. She arrived
at Houston and tendered NOR on 17th December, 1984. But she did not berth due to
the dense fog although the berth which was going to berth was always available in
relevant time. The vessel berth and started to discharge on 20th December, and
completed on 11th January, 1985. The owners claim demurrage and allege that the
discharge laytime started after the NOR from 1400 hours on 17 th December. The
charterers denied the effectiveness of the NOR.
The charterparty was Gencon. The clause about discharging port/place is as follow:
“Discharging port of place-1/2 safe always afloat, always accessible berth(s) each
port …”
This meant that it was a berth charter. Besides, the clause 5 is as follow:
“… cargo are to be … discharged free of expense and risk for Owners.
Time to commence at 2 pm if notice of readiness … is given before Noon and at 8 am
next working day if notice given during office hours after noon … time lost in waiting
for berth to count as loading time …
Time to count … Wipon/Wibon/Wifpon/Wccon …”
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Pay attention to the clause 6 in Gencon. There is a sentence meaning “time lost
waiting for berth to count as laytime”. But it was not applied on this case because the
berth was always available.
The first instance by the Arbitration Court (Mr. Bruce Harris) judged that WIBON
changed a berth charter into a port charter. So, the NOR was effective, and the
owners win the claim of demurrage. Moreover, the dense fog could not interrupt the
laytime because there was not an exception aiming at this aspect. And it was far from
mistakes by owners.
The case appealed to the High Court and the judgement was overthrown. The Justice thought over 6 relevant precedents: The “Nessfield” (1912) 1 K. B. 434, The
“Santa Clara Valley” (1938) 62 Lloyd’s Rep. 23, The “Amstelmolen” (1961) 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 1, The “Seafort” (1962) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 147, The “Johanna Oldendorff” (1973) 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 285 and The “Maratha Envoy” (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 301. And his conclusion was that there were not binding judgement in this aspect in the 6 precedents.
So, he judged the owners lose. Because,
“The ‘WIBON’ provision did not override the primary obligations created by the
charter or those obligations as modified by the express exceptions and it did not affect, in principle as distinct from detail, the question where the risk was to fall in the
event of delay affecting the vessel; the arbitrator was wrong in his conclusion and
laytime did not commence until the vessel arrives at the berth; the charterers were
under no outstanding liability to the owners.”
In addition, the Justice Webster said that
“Even if the ‘Wibon’ had the effect of converting a berth charter to a port charter, the
vessel was not an arrived ship at the port because she was not at that time at the

40

immediate and effective disposition of the charterers even though she was not being
used for the owners’ purpose.”
The judgement by the High Court seems different from some traditional parlance. As
the judgement of Mr. Harris said, the WIBON change a berth charter into a port
charter, which was a well-established authority. But there were a significant part of
people who thought that to share the risk like what was that the risk of berth congestion was on the charterers and the risk of weather or sailing was on the owners. And
WIBON had no clear explanation. Anyway, the judgement was appealed to the Court
of Appeal and overthrown by 3 Justices. They recovered the Arbitration Award.
There were 3 reasons in the judgement of the Justice Lloyd:
1)

WIBON has no any limit;

2)

Traditional parlance to WIBON;

3)

Importance of the positiveness from business contract.

The judgement by the Court of Appeal was overthrown when it was appealed to the
House of Lords. And the House of Lords supported the judgement by the High Court.
And there was no appeal any longer. So, the judgement of the House of Lords is the
present English Law. The Lord Brandon refuted the 3 reasons from the Justice Lloyd
one by one as follow:
“First, as to the absence of any words of qualification, I accept, of course, that the
phrase ‘in berth or not’ does not of itself indicate that being in berth or not is related to
the availability of a berth. I do not, however, think it possible, when interpreting a
phrase which has been regularly included in berth charterparties over a long period,
to disregard long-established authority as to the purpose intended to be served by it.
The authorities to which I referred earlier show that, since 1912 at least, it has been
recognised that the purpose of the phrase was to deal with the problem of a ship
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charter under a berth charterparty arriving at her port of destination and finding no
berth available to her, there is further no reported case prior to this one in which it
has ever been suggested that the phrase was intended to deal with the problem of a
ship chartered under a berth charterparty arriving at a port where a berth is available
for her but being prevented by bad weather from proceeding to it. As I indicated, the
phrase has been treated as shorthand for what, if set out in longhand, would be
‘whether in berth (a berth being available) or not in berth (a berth not being available)’.
The phrase has been interpreted and applied in that way for so long that I think that it
should continue to be so interpreted and applied.
Secondly, the traditional view of the effect of the phrase. Lord Justice Lloyd said that
this view had always been that the phrase became operative so to enable a valid
notice of readiness to be given as soon as the vessel has arrived in the port provided
that the other conditions of a valid notice are satisfied. I cannot accept this generalization as correct. So far as cases where no berth is available when the ship arrives
are concerned, that has certainly been the traditional view. But, so far as cases
where a berth is available for the ship on arrival but unreachable by reason of bad
weather are concerned, no traditional view has ever been established, for the simple
reason that the question of the effect of the phrase in that situation has never previously arisen from decision by any court.
Thirdly, the need for certainty, I accept that certainty of interpretation is a most desirable characteristic of any contract, especially a commercial contract containing
expressions commonly in use. I cannot see, however, that a decision that the phrase
‘whether in berth or not’ only takes effect when a berth is not available provides any
less certainty than a decision that it also takes effect when a berth is available but is
unreachable by reason of bad weather.”
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In a word, the conclusion of the Lord Brandon was that
“… I am of opinion, having regard to the authorities to which I referred earlier and the
context in which the acronym ‘WIBON’ is to be found in the charterparty here concerned, that the phrase ‘whether in berth or not’ should be interpreted as applying
only to cases where a berth is not available and not also to cases where a berth is
available but is unreachable by reason of bad weather.”
There is some degree of uncertainty in present law. In the past, even in berth charter,
but with WIBON, usually, the vessel could tender NOR immediately without any
consideration as soon as she arrived at the port. But at present, it seems that, before
tendering NOR, the Master has to check out the reason what prevent the vessel to
berth. If the reason is berth congestion, he can tender NOR securely. If the reason is
something else such as dense fog and the berth is just available, he must remember
to tender NOR after the fog dispersed, or it is unable to commence the laytime according to the clause in charterparty. That means the owner/Master must stare at the
berth whether it is available or unavailable.

3.2 Condition 2: ready ship
This is the second condition to commence the laytime. The vessel mus t be ready
physically and legally to loading or discharge. What extent the ready should be according to the characters of the relevant cargo such as clean or dirty. Under the
Common Law, “ready” means that
1)

The cargo spaces (holds for dry cargo ship, including wind holds for bulk grain,

tanks for tanker) were ready;
2)

The relevant equipment and facilities were ready;

3)

All the relevant documents concerning the vessel were ready.
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3.2.1 Physically Ready

3.2.1.1 Cargo Spaces
The requirements about clean and ready cargo spaces are strict. There was a case,
The “Tres Flores” (1973) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 247, in the Court of Appeal.
The details are as follow:
“By a charter-party in Synacomex form dated Oct. 27, 1970, the owners of the motor
vessel Tres Flores chartered her to the charterers for a voyage from Varna or Burgas
at the charterers' option for the carriage of maize. The charter-party provided (inter
alia):
6. … Any time lost in fitting the shifting boards or other material not to count as laytime. Before tendering notice Master has to take necessary measures for holds to be
clean, dry, without smell and in every way suitable to receive grain to Shippers'/Charterers' satisfaction.
21. At loading port, time to commence, whether vessel be in berth or not … at 2 p.m.,
if written notice is given during usual local office hours before noon and at 8 a.m. next
working day if notice is given during usual office hours after noon. Master is allowed
to give the notice of readiness by telegram when ship is arrived on the road of loading port …
The charterers ordered the vessel to Varna. She arrived in the roads there at 0500
hours on Sunday, Nov. 22. No berth was available for her. At 1000 hours the master
gave notice of readiness to load. On Friday, Nov. 27 at 1515 hours the vessel was
inspected by the port authorities. Pests were found in the cargo spaces and fumigation was ordered. This took place between 1500 hours and 1930 hours on Monday,
Nov. 30, whilst the vessel was still in the roads. At 1100 hours on Tuesday, Dec. 1,
the charterers accepted the notice of readiness.”
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The owner thought that the NOR tendered on 22n d November was effective. At that
time, the vessel arrived and the Master thought that she was ready honestly. So, the
laytime should be commenced on the second day, 23 rd November according to
Clause 21. The charterer thought that the vessel was not ready until the NOR accepted after fumigation on 1st December. Thus, the delay of waiting for berth from
22th November to 1st December was shift to the owners due to the fumigation which
seemed a small problem.
The Arbitration Court judged that the owner won. From another point of view, means
that the charterers had an absolute responsibility (ignore that cannot go on board
due to bad weather) to go on board to inspect as soon as possible or at once. So,
they should respond the delay. Obviously, this judgement had something sympathy
to the owners.
The charterers appealed to the High Court. The judgement was overthrown. The
Justice Mocatta aimed at the NOR and said that
“On the evidence, the vessel was not ready to load on Sunday, Nov. 22, and could
not give notice of readiness to load on that day, for her holds were infested; and
clause 21 did not appear to make any difference to the common-law obligations of
the shipowner prior to his being able to give a valid notice of readiness.”
As for the fumigation which was thought a small problem only cost four and a half
hours and 170 dollars, could be ignored. The Justice Mocatta did not agree to use de
minimis rule. He said that
“It is the duty, in my judgment, of the shipowner to make his ship fit to carry cargo. If
he does not do this, he is not in a position, as long as his ship is unfit, to give a valid
notice of readiness. No doubt to certain facts, as in all branches of the law, the
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maxim de minimis would apply, but I do not consider that the facts did not show that
the amount of infection fell within the de minimis principle.”
At the last, as for the judgement that whether the charterers had an absolute responsibility to go on board to inspect as soon as possible or at once, the Justice
Mocatta overthrow it and said that
“The charterers were under no contractual duty to inspect the holds before loading
and were entitled to rely on the owner’s fulfilling their obligations to provide a vessel
which was to receive the contractual cargo; (obiter) even if they were under such an
obligation, the obligation was not an absolute one whatever the weather, and on the
evidence bad weather made inspection impossible before Friday, Nov. 27.”
This case was appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Justice Mocatta’s judgement
was confirmed.

3.2.1.2 De minimis
Although the “ready” is treated strictly, there are also some really slight cleaning
works without affecting the operation of loading or discharge can be ignored rely on
de minimis rule. There was a London Arbitration in Commencement of Laytime, vol.4,
Donald Davies, pp.160, The “Despina” (1980). The vessel could not pass the inspection at one time, and passed after clean. She berthed after waiting for berth in
anchorage for 7 days. But it was found larva in one of the holds, and needed one
hour to clear away. But there was not delay after this work because that hold with
larva was not the last loading hold. As a result, the sole arbitrator judged that this
situation could be ignored by de minimis rule. So, the owners won.
Besides, there was another London Arbitration, the “Sati Rani” (1977), in the same
book page 213. The relevant clauses in charterparty are as follow:
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“Time for loading shall commence to count 24 hours after the written notice, and a
certificate from a Marine Surveyor approved by the Charterers certifying the vessel’s
readiness in all cargo spaces, whether in berth or not, has been given by the Master
or agents … that the steamer is ready to receive cargo.”
The vessel arrived at roads and tendered the NOR at noon on 30th May. Evidently, at
that time, there was not inspector accepted by the charterers on board, much less
than issuing any proving. The vessel sailed to the berth at 1400 hours on 2 nd June,
and the agent of charterers accepted the NOR at 1530 hours on the same day, and
the vessel began to loading at 1640 hours. But the proving of past inspection was
signed at 0930 hours on 3rd June, of cause, without any problem. Then, there was
depute that what time to commence the laytime. The Arbitration Court judge that the
charterers lost, and thought that the NOR tendered on 30th May in roads was effective, the laytime should be commenced after 24 hours by de minimis rule. The
judgement said that
“It appears to us that, in view of loading having commenced on June 2 at 16.40, the
survey on June 3 turned out to be a mere formality. The survey showed that the
vessel’s compartments were ready in all respects and had no effect on the loading
operation which had commenced the previous day. Since the survey turned out to be
a mere formality, and did not lead to any interruption in the loading process, it should
have no effect on the laytime computation. Where there is a mere formality to be effected, which does not affect the position in any way, the tendency is to disregard the
formality, see The ‘Delian Spirit’; we realize that, in that case, there was no express
wording in the charterparty now before us, but we think that a general principle has
been evolved which allows a liberal approach to be charterparty provisions are
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looked at in a global sense and without undue fastidiousness. Further, the de minimis
principle militates against the charterers.”

3.2.2 Legally Ready
This mainly means that some documents and formalities before entering the port and
loading or discharging. It is said that those documents and formalities must be ready,
and then begin to loading or discharging including many “idle formalities”.

3.2.2.1 Free Pratique
In the early cases, the treatment for free pratique was strict. It could say that the NOR
was ineffective before free pratique. This point of view did not change until this case,
The “Delian Spirit” (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 506. The Court of Appeal judged that the
free pratique was an idle formality. The vessel arrived at Tuapse, Black Sea, Russia
in dawn on 19th February, 1964 and tendered the NOR at 0800. She waited for berth
in anchorage until 24th February. The charterers denied the NOR, and allege that the
vessel had no free pratique. The Justice Donaldson of the High Court judged that
free pratique was an idle formality and said that
“The mere fact that free pratique had not been obtained did not prevent the vessel
from being an ‘arrived ship’ if it could be obtained at any time and without the poss ibility of delaying the loading; and, in the present case, the obtaining of free pratique
had no effect on when the loading began …”
The judgement was supported in the Court of Appeal. But the Lord Denning explained that the “idle formality” only applied on the normal situation. He said that
“If a ship is known to be infected by a disease such as to prevent her getting her
pratique, she would not be ready to load or discharge. But if she has apparently a
clean bill of health, such that there is no reason to fear delay, then even though she
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has not been given her pratique, she is entitled to give notice of readiness, and laytime will begin to run.”
This situation of disease could take this case, The “Apollo” (1978) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 200,
as example. The vessel arrived at the Naples, Italy to discharge. But two seamen
were doubted infecting typhus, and that was confirmed after. The vessel needed to
wait for one and a half days to pass inspection. This was not the idle formality.

3.2.2.2 Custom Clearance
Under the idea of this case, The “Delian Spirit” (1971) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 506, the custom
clearance and the free pratique were the same that they were necessary formalities
in every port. So, the custom clearance was an idle formality. In other words, there
was not effect to tender the NOR before custom clearance.

3.2.2.2.1 Make the custom clearance a precondition of effective NOR by
expressed clause
In this case, The “Venore” (1973) AMC 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) in America, the Clause
38 was written as follow:
“For each lightening vessel at Calcutta, time to count from 24 hours after master’s
written Notice of Readiness to discharge, given to charterers or their agents … vessel also having been entered at Custom House and in free pratique whether in berth
or not.”
In Britain, there was this famous case, The “Shackleford” (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 154.
Its Clause 13 was written as follow:
“Notification of the vessel’s readiness at port of discharge must be delivered at the
office of Agroexport Bucharest/Constanza or their agents Navlomar Constanza, at or
before 4 pm (or at or before 12 noon of on Saturday) on official working days, vessel
also having been entered at the Custom House and the laydays will then commence
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at 8 am on the next business day, whether in berth or not, whether in port or not,
whether in free pratique or not.
In another case, The “Puerto Rocca” (1978) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 252, the Clause 47 was
written as follow:
“Time to count at discharge port from the first working period on the next business
day following vessels customs clearance and receipt of written notice of readiness
during ordinary office hours by charterers agents from 0900 hours to 1700 hours
from Monday to Friday, unless a holiday whether in berth or not.”
The clauses above were very risky for the owners. Originally, if there is a relaxed
clause about tendering the NOR in charterparty such as WIBON/WIPON, it is possible to shift the risk of port congestion to the charterers. But that is only on geography
but not the preconditions. If there are some preconditions about free pratique or custom clearance which is unable to fulfil in some ports that waiting in roads. Thus,
these preconditions are contradictory with WIPON. So, it is not totally unable to c oordinate if there are those preconditions (free pratique or custom clearance) in one
charterparty at the same time. For example, the vessel can berth to refuel or water as
early as possible and do the free pratique and custom clearance at the same time,
then go back to roads to wait. So, it is not enough reason to deny the preconditions
even that.

3.2.2.2.2 The case about what is custom clearance according to the local
law
Another problem is that, what is custom clearance in a certain port, due to the various law and practice between ports. The Indian government as the charterer made a
very strict charterparty and they did not fear of litigation. So, only about this point,
there were at least 5 English cases with different judgements. The strict clause was
about that the NOR could be tendered only after custom clearance. This was a huge
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mine to deny a large number of demurrage in the very congested Indian ports at that
time. These clauses could be seen in this case, The “Antclizo” (1992) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
558, the Clause 34 was written as follow:
“At first of sole discharge port or place, time to count from 24 hours after receipt of
Master’s written Notice of Readiness to discharge given to Charterers or their Agents
during ordinary office hours on a weekday before 4 p.m. (similarly before noon if on a
Saturday), vessel also having been entered at Custom House and an free pratique
whether in berth or not.”
But what is custom clearance? There was a unique rule in the discharging port
Bombay, India. According to the India Customs Act 1962, there were at least two
steps to custom clearance. The first step was called Prior Entry. It can be done as
soon as the vessel arrived at the Bombay Floating Light. If it was past, the importer
can receive a customs clearance certificate. The content roughly as follow:
“Cargo manifest of vessel … having been presented by M/s … Import Rotation
Number … has been assigned to the said vessel due to arrive at … The undertaking
for completing various formalities has been executed by the aforesaid agents. After
the submission of the store list (in duplicate) and crew property list (in duplicate)
sighed by the Master and when the vessel is about to begin discharge of her cargo,
the concerned Preventive Officer in the section may grant her entry inwards.”
The second step was done when the vessel got the anchorage or berth to prepare for
discharging. If the customs officer came on board, the master gave him a store list
and a crew property list. The officer would seal that “Inward entry is granted to this
vessel for the purpose of section 31 of the Customs Act 1962.” on the early customs
clearance certificate after inspection. Thus, the second step was completed.
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The dispute between owners and charterers was that which step should be counted
as custom clearance. In these two early case, The “Apollo” (1983) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 409
and The “Delian Leto” (1983) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496, they judged that the Prior Entry
could fulfil the precondition. The Justice Bingham said that in The “Apollon”,
“In my judgment this is a point of quite unreasonable technicality and one which
cannot prevail against the clear and, to my mind, very convincing reasoning of the
learned umpire. He was, in my judgment, entitled to hold that for all practical purposes the entry that mattered was the entry that occurred on September 19, that being, so far as customs were concerned, the formal prelude to discharge. Although the
language of the charterparty did not expressly refer to entry under the ‘prior to entry’
rules, it was, in my judgment, both the correct and the commercial construction of this
contract that the vessel was indeed entered at the time when entry was necessary
and required in order to permit discharge.”
But in these two latter cases, The “Albion” (1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365 and The “Nestor”
(1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 649, the Justice Webster and Leggatt judged that it must
complete the second step according to the Customs Act 1962. The reason was that it
was unable to discharge and illegal by only Prior Entry.
Fortunately, there was a final verdict in this aspect. Because the 4 various judgements of the High Court were overthrown by this case, The “Antclizo” (No. 2) (1992)
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 558 of the Court of Appeal. It judged that the Prior Entry could fulfil the
precondition in the Clause 34.

3.3 Condition 3: NOR
In common law, the owner tender the NOR in order to let the charterers/consignors
know that the vessel arrive at the loading port and is ready to load, and the laytime
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can be commenced. Even in the unfixed laytime such as CQD, the vessel still has
the requirement to tender the NOR.
Certainly, there will be various variations. For example, the charterer had many kinds
of cargo to prepare. It was unfair to load as soon as the vessel arrived. So, the
charterers needed to express some clauses to protect themselves.

3.3.1 Tender the NOR in office time
The charterers can only receive the NOR in office time and prepare cargo. So, most
of charterparties of dry cargo vessel have a convention that to tender the NOR in office time. But this can bring disputes, because there are various situations and wordings. For example, in this London Arbitration, LMLN No. 594 (2002):
“The vessel was chartered on an amended Sugar Charter Party 1969 form for the
carriage of a cargo of sugar in bags from Brazil to Lagos, Nigeria and/or Tema,
Ghana. In the event, the vessel discharged at Lagos. A number of disputes were
subsequently referred to arbitration.
Clause 22 of the charter provided:
‘At first (or sole) discharging port, laytime to commence 24 hours after written notice
of readiness to deliver cargo has been tended to Agents in ordinary office hours,
whether in berth or not, Saturdays after noon, (except in Lagos where from Fridays 5
pm Saturdays), Sunday (or local equivalents) and holidays excepted…’
The statement of facts stated that ‘working hours’ in Lagos began each working day
at 0730 hours. The shipowners took that as evidence that office hours began at the
same time. That information coincided with that provided by the BIMCO ‘Holiday
Calendar’ for the port of Lagos. However, the charterers contended that office hours
were different from port working hours, and argued that office hours in Lagos began
at 0800 hours.
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Held, that BIMCO had been asked to provide an opinion, and had pointed out that
‘office hours’ and ‘working hours’ did not necessarily coincide; also that according to
their data (which was admittedly several years old), private sector office hours in
Lagos began at 0800 hours Monday to Friday, although public sector office hours
began at 0730 hours. On a private sector basis the office opening hours on the relevant date would have been at 0800 hours. That assumption had been confirmed
directly by local agents who had stated unequivocally that ‘The normal office hours at
Lagos commence at 0800 hours and not 0730 hours’.
In the present case the ordinary office hours of the vessel’s port agents began at
0700 hours in a weekday morning. However, evidence from the P&I Club correspondents was to the effect that, in general, port agent’s office offices opened at
0730 hours, in line with the opening hours of the port authority, which one would
expect.
In the tribunal’s view, the evidence established that office hours commenced at 0730
hours, as contended for by the owners.”

3.3.2 Notice time

3.3.2.1 Is the exceptions and calculation methods about laytime apply
on the notice time?
This is few disputes under the Gencon. For example, the commencement of laytime
is at 1300 hours or 0600 hours on second day according to the time the NOR tendered. What if the notice time was written as 24 hours or 36 hours?
If the charterers did not want the 24 hours’ notice time did not stop during Sundays
and holidays, their wording should be very careful when they sign the charter. For
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example, using the clause which was in this case, Graigwen (Owners) v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co. Ltd (1955) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 260,
“Lay days at first loading port to commerce 24 hours, Sundays and holidays excepted, after receipt by charterers or their agents of master’s notice during ordinary
working hours, that steamer is entered at the Customs House and in all respect
ready to load.”

3.3.2.2 The unclear notice time
Although, there was an expressed convention about the notice time, the expression
must be clear and explicit. Or it would bring lawsuits. For example, there was an inexplicable clause in this case, The “Nedon” (1962) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 378,
“6. Time for loading to count from 8 a.m. 48 hours after the ship is reported and
ready … and for discharging from 8 a.m. 24 hours after ship is reported …”
The vessel arrived and prepared at the loading port at 0900 hours on 24th September,
1957. The owners said that the laytime of loading should be commenced at 0900
48hours (2 days) later, while the charterers said that at 0800 3 days later. Why 3
days? 0900 on 24th September plus 48 hours is 0900 on 26th which is over 0800, so,
the vessel has to wait 23 hours more till 0800 on 27th (3 days).
In the court, these inexplicable clauses are explained by the justice. The
well-qualified justice can naturally make a convictive explanation. The Justice McNair
thought that this clause was unfair to give 23 hours more. It only aimed at the time
inconvenient after 48 hours. For example, the vessel arrived at 0400. Then that was
inconvenient to commence loading at 0400 after 48 hours, and extended to 0800
later. But in this case, 0900 was in office time. So, the laytime could be commenced
at 0900 48 hours later. The Justice McNair said that
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“… the charterers get the dual protection suggested by the shipowners, namely 48
hours clear before the loading time shall start and that the expiry of the 48 hours shall
not start at some inconvenient time, and one should accordingly, read: ‘from 8 a.m.’
as ‘not earlier than 8 a.m.’.”
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4 Calculation of laytime
4.1 Interruptions to laytime
In the charterparties or contracts, if there was a fixed laytime, the charterers had an
absolute and unconditional contractual obligation. There was one situation that the
owner made some mistakes can interrupt the laytime. From surface, it is a matter of
course that if the owner made some mistakes, the laytime (and demurrage) could be
interrupted. Theoretically, the charterer could claim indemnity if the owner made
mistakes.
In this case, The “Union Amsterdam” (1982) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 432, the laytime was
commenced when the vessel was in anchorage, and it was already on demurrage.
When there was an available berth, the vessel stranded in the channel and delayed 5
days. The owner asked the charterer for demurrage. But the charterer said that
stranding was the owner’s fault. The Justice Parker said that
“… the grounding was due to the negligence of the owners or those for whom they
were responsible and what owners are really saying is: ‘although the delay was
caused by our negligence you must nevertheless pay for the detention of the vessel
because were you claiming damages for delay, which you are not, you could be defeated by clause 35.’ This argument cannot, in my judgment, succeed. In the first
place in general principles an exception clause should be given no wider operation
that its words allow. In the second place a breach of duty remains a breach of duty,
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and therefore fault, notwithstanding that liability for the breach is excluded. In the
third place, far from doing nothing to prevent the vessel being available, owners have,
by negligent navigational management, prevented her and ,as Lord Justice Bankes
said [in the Ropner Shipping case], it does not lie in their mouths to say the vessel
was being detained by the charterers during the period when by their negligence she
was grounded.”
There was another reason to support this case. It was that the disclaimer was only
used as shield but not sword. It means that the disclaimer was used to demur, but not
to support the claim.

4.2 Laytime ending
The risk of losing time, for example, delay when the vessel was leaving the berth/port,
was shift to the owner as soon as the laytime end. Then when the laytime end?
When the loading or discharging complete.

4.2.1 Loading completion
What was loading completion? The first case was The “Headcliffe” (1931) 41 Lloyd’s
Rep. 262. The judgement was that binding (cargo was wood) one of the loading operations, although binding cargo seemed more concerning to seaworthiness than
loading. The Justice Wright said that
“I think that in a case like this, and, indeed, in most cases, the mere reception or
dumping down of the cargo on the ship does not involve the completion of the loading , because I think the operation of loading involves all that is required to put the
cargo in a condition in which it can be carried …. If it were necessary to decide the
matter, but it is not, I should also hold that on the facts on this case the lashing was a
necessary part of the operation of loading… the crew were actually engaged in lash-
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ing the after-deck cargo when the accident occurred – and I think it is an integral part
of the operation of loading in the case of a vessel situated like this and lying with her
deck cargo in an exposed roadstead.”
Certainly, there are other operations like that such as stowing, bagging, trimming and
etc. It can be concluded by a sentence from Laytime and Demurrage, vol.5, John
Schofield, section 5.33. It is that “The laytime will run until loading is completed and
the vessel can proceed on her voyage in safety.”

4.2.2 Discharge completion
The cleaning works after discharge completion, for example, taking out the dunnage,
had no effects to the discharging operations. Just as what is finishing lunch? That
would not include wash the dishes. But under the freedom of contract, both parties
can make any convention. Just as the Clause 5(a) in Gencon 1994, “The Charterers
shall be responsible for and pay the cost of removing their dunnage after discharge
of the cargo under this Charter Party and time to count until dunnage has been removed.”
If there are valueless cargo still in the holds, and the consignee did not want to discharge, that was not effects to end the discharge laytime. It was not extendable due
to sending sailor to collect the innage.
In this case, The “Joan Ena” (1920) 4 Lloyd’s Rep. 343, the ship carried barley in
bags from San Francisco, America to Sharpness, Britain. The discharge was completed on 2n d January. But there were some leakage barley in holds. The sailors collected 2 to 3 days. At last, there was more than 10 tons barley with varying degrees
of damages. The dispute was whether the discharge laytime ended on 2 nd or 5th. The
Justice McCardie thought that should be 2nd:
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“The question concerned is when the discharge was in substance complete i.e. in a
practical sense. In my opinion, this completion took place on January 2. It was regarded by both parties as the ship’s duty to collect the grains beneath boards. I think
that the ship collected it rather for its own convenience than for the benefit of the
defendants, and the matter is so regarded according to the practice at Sharpness.”
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5 Demurrage
5.1 Finality and Jupiter Clause
5.1.1 Finality
Under the normal circumstances, the demurrage finalized as soon as the loading and
discharging end. If the discharge operation was not complete, and the vessel departed forever (without any idea about coming back to continue discharge) due to
security, the demurrage would be finalized. Just as the Clause 18 in Gencon 1994:
“If during discharging the Master for fear of the Vessel being frozen in deems it advisable to leave, he has liberty to do so with what cargo he has on board and to proceed to the nearest accessible port where she can safely discharge.”
There is a case about this aspect, Petrinovic & Co. Ltd. v. Mission Francaise des
Transports Maritimes (1941) 71 Lloyd’s Rep. 208. The vessel was going to Bordeaux,
France to discharge. When she arrived at the port, it was controlled by the French
government. The army of Nazi Germany was coming into the port before the vessel
complete her discharging. Although the flag of vessel was Yugoslavia, the vessel
was still afraid of expropriated by Nazi Germany. So she departed at once. The Justice Atkinson judged that the demurrage finalized while the vessel departed:
“It is quite true that a charterer may continue to be liable to pay demurrage, although
the discharging is interfered with by, for example, temporary or by voluntary departures of the ship, such as being driven out to sea, or some temporary inability of the
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ship to discharge, if, for instance, she is damaged by a collision; but I think it is perfectly clear that the obligation to pay demurrage cannot continue if the ship is taken
away finally for her own purpose, for her own safety, under such circumstances as to
make it quite clear that there is no intention whatever of her coming back to the port
of discharge to enable the discharge to be completed.”

5.1.2 Jupiter Clause
If the charterers kept silent instead of to tell the owners that there was no cargo to
load to break the charterparty as The “Bow Cedar” LMLN No. 656 (2005), which
could be a disaster for owners. Theoretically, the owners had demurrage to prevent
themselves from this time of waiting. But if the demurrage accumulated to a large
amount of money even an astronomical figure, it was unknown whether they can
receive the demurrage successfully. So, the owners would feel very uneasy. But
usually, the demurrage was the only one relief about that.
In this case, Aktieselskabet Reider v. Arcos Ltd. (1926) 25 Lloyd’s Rep. 513, there
was the dispute concerning the situation above. The Justice Bankes said that
“I see no sufficient reason for construing the provision for demurrage as contained in
the charterparty in the present case as a contractual extension of the lay days either
for a reasonable time or for any other time, or as an implied term of the contract that
the vessel shall remain for any time. I prefer to rest the necessity for remaining upon
the ground that, time not being of the essence of the contract, the shipowner will not,
except under some exceptional circumstances, be in a position to assert that the
contract has been repudiated unless the vessel does remain for a sufficient time to
enable that question to be tested.”
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This as much as to say that the owner must wait for loading until the charterparty
interrupted automatically due to hindered. So, the owners absolutely need to add the
Jupiter Clause into charterparty to limit the time for waiting cargo in loading port.

5.2 Time limitation
The time of validity of a claim of demurrage was popular in the last twenty to thirty
years. Of course, these clauses were benefit to the charterers. Just as the Justice
Bingham said that in this case, The “Oltenia” (1982) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 448,
“The commercial intention underlying this clause seems to me plainly to have been to
ensure that claims were by the owners within a short period of final discharge so that
the claims could be investigated and if possible resolved while the facts were still
fresh …. This object could only be achieved if the charterers were put in possession
of the factual material which they required in order to satisfy themselves whether the
claims were well-founded or not …”
At last, there are some warnings to the owner. Try the best to do not accept these
clauses about the time of validity of a claim of demurrage. If to accept, make the time
long enough such as in about a year. At the same time, think about the character of
the relevant voyage, for example, with the uncontrollable and chaotic ports. Also,
there are some suggestions for the charterers. Try the best to insist the relevant
clause, and make the time as shout as possible such as no more than 3 months or
shorter.
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6 Conclusion
Everyone does not want the dissensions or disputes no matter the owners or the
charterers. But unavoidably, both the parties have their own position and benefit.
Then, it is very important to avoid the dissensions or disputes. The both parties must
read up every clause thoroughly before they sign the charterparty, and exactly know
the own rights and obligations. It is deserved to fulfil the obligations while enjoy the
rights. DO NOT hope to enjoy more and fulfil less. But in this society that each trying
to cheat the other, there are still some people (owner or charterer) playing with words
in the charterparty and making the opposite fall into the traps. Although it cannot say
that they break the law under the freedom of contract, the harmful effect they made
to the shipping industry is enormous. In order to deal with these people, we must
know more. In a word, under the freedom of contract, which one knows more, the
one is dominated.
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